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INTRODUCTION

The financing of financially distressed companies is challenging.
While additional financing could be provided outside of formal
insolvency proceedings, corporate statutes in many jurisdictions prohibit
incurring of additional debt while insolvent unless there is notice to, and
consent of, creditors. In such circumstances, absent special protection,
creditors are reluctant to advance further financing. Where debt is held
by multiple creditors, insolvency proceedings are usually necessary to
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prevent a race to the assets and to allow the debtor company a short
period in which to determine whether a going concern business plan and
financing are possible.
Different jurisdictions place greater or lesser importance on offering
a restructuring solution to firms in financial distress in addition to
liquidation procedures. Where a restructuring option is available, many,
but not all, jurisdictions have realized that any going concern strategy
requires a means of financing the business until the appropriate workout
plan can be devised, whether it is a restructuring of debt and equity, a
going concern sale or a liquidating sale. This financing is called debtor
in possession ("DIP") financing in Canada, and post-commencement
financing in other jurisdictions; it provides the financing to continue
operations during the insolvency proceeding and to cover the costs of
insolvency and legal professionals in that proceeding. It is often
connected closely to "exit-financing," the capital that will be needed to
exit protection under the stay or moratorium provisions of insolvency
legislation, and to assist the debtor company in the first period after
restructuring.
There are a number of sources of post-commencement financing.
They include the sale of some of the debtor's assets or the willingness of
suppliers to continue supplying on credit for a limited period. In many
jurisdictions, such financing historically came primarily from pre-filing
banking and other traditional operating lenders. Pre-filing creditors often
have an incentive to continue to lend, based on a desire to preserve
ongoing business relations, the need to protect already sunk costs, and
the potential for longer term upside credit relationships. In some
instances, pre-filing lenders extend financing to ensure that their interests
are not trumped by new financing that receives a priority charge. Even
where their claims are already covered by their secured charge on the
debtor's assets, pre-filing secured creditors may agree to provide DIP
financing where they want to ensure that their position is not
compromised during the workout process; that the debtor restructures in
a manner that maximizes protection of their interests; or to maintain
some control over the debtor during the proceedings.
Whether the post-commencement financing lender is a pre-filing
creditor or not, it is unlikely to lend absent a secured charge. While
some jurisdictions only allow post-commencement financing on as yet
unencumbered assets or as a lower priority security interest on already
encumbered assets where the value of the encumbered asset is
sufficiently in excess of the amount of the pre-existing secured
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obligation,' in Canada, priority secured charges for DIP financing can
extend to already secured assets, if particular pre-conditions are met,
such as notice to creditors.2
At the height of the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, forbearance
was a primary strategy for not forcing many businesses into insolvency,
as manufacturing and other sectors were reeling from the ripple effects of
the failure of financial institutions, the collapse of the asset-based
commercial paper and mortgage markets, and the overall unavailability
of credit. Banks and other lenders would grant extensions of time,
renegotiate credit terms, or forbear on exercising their self-enforcement
remedies for a specified period. As the worst of the crisis ended and
credit continued to be tight, new strategies had to be developed to allow
financing of insolvent debtors. This article explores some of those
strategies for post-commencement financing, using Canadian insolvency
law as illustrative of changes in the credit market. Part II discusses postcommencement financing generally, introducing some of the ongoing
policy issues, the challenge of such financing for corporate groups and in
cross-border proceedings, as well as recent changes to Canadian statutory
language. Part III examines the growing trend of stalking horse
proceedings as a mechanism to finance the workout or as a resolution to
the debtor's financial distress, including the recent introduction of credit
bids. Part IV discusses the impact of the introduction of distressed debt
lenders into the insolvency financing market in a number of jurisdictions,
and their effect on workout dynamics, including one case of a "rogue
white knight." Finally, Part V discusses the impact of credit default
swaps and other credit derivatives on the economic incentives in a
restructuring proceeding.
II.

POST-COMMENCEMENT FINANCING OF INSOLVENT DEBTORS

If there is to be a restructuring aspect to any insolvency law, it must
address the issue of post-commencement financing. New finance is
often required on a fairly urgent basis to ensure the continued operation
of the business while it is determining its future. The UNCITRAL
Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law suggests that workout financing
can be funded out of the debtor's existing cash flow through operation of
a stay and cessation of payments on pre-commencement liabilities; or,
where the debtor has no funds to meet immediate cash flow needs,
financing may take the form of trade credit extended to the debtor by
vendors of goods or services, or through loans or other forms of finance
1. UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 116 (New York: United
Nations, 2005).
2. See discussion in Part III, infra, of the statutory criteria.
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extended by lenders.3 It observes that post-commencement finance
needs to be balanced against the need to uphold commercial bargains; to
protect the pre-existing rights and priorities of creditors; to minimize any
negative impact on the availability of credit; and to consider the impact
on unsecured creditors if remaining unencumbered assets are used to
secure new lending, leaving nothing available for distribution if a
reorganization were to fail.4
In jurisdictions where court approval is required, the court often
engages in a balancing of interests and prejudice between the parties.
Secured creditors may be required to make some sacrifice because of the
reasonably anticipated benefits for all stakeholders, including employees,
trade suppliers and other creditors.' Even on an urgent basis, notice
should be given to creditors prior to subordinating their interests, in order
to avoid their having to incur the additional costs of seeking to set aside
an initial order approving financing. UNCITRAL suggests that the
number of authorizations for such financing be kept to a minimum,
generally preferring that decision making rest with the insolvency
professional rather than with the court.6 In Canada, DIP financing
requires court approval. While the courts have been fairly consistent in
respecting the statutory hierarchy of creditors' claims, they have engaged
in a balancing of multiple interests during consideration of financing
requests, having regard to the express aims and language of the
insolvency statute.
The courts have cautioned that there should be cogent evidence that
the benefit of DIP financing clearly outweighs the potential prejudice to

3. UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 114 (New York: United
Nations, 2005).
4. Id. at 115.
5. United Used Auto & Truck Parts Ltd., Re (1999), 12 C.B.R. (4th) 144 (B.C. S.C.
[In Chambers]), affirmed (2000), [2000] B.C.J. No. 409, 16 C.B.R. (4th) 141 (B.C. C.A.),
leave to appeal allowed but appeal discontinued (2000), [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 142, 2000
CarswellBC 2132, 2000 CarswellBC 2133 (S.C.C.) $$ 2, 9, 12; JANIs P. SARRA,
CREDITOR RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, RESTRUCTURING INSOLVENT CORPORATIONS

(2003).
6. UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 116 (New York: United
Nations, 2005). The Guide notes that although requiring court involvement may generally
assist in promoting transparency and provide additional assurance to lenders, in many
instances the insolvency representative may be in a better position to assess the need for
new finance. Similarly, where secured creditors consent to revised treatment of their
security interests, approval of the court may not be required. UNCITRAL suggests that
the court will generally not have access to expertise or information additional to that
provided by the insolvency representative on which to base its decision. Id.
7. Both the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors
ArrangementAct in Canada have provisions for restructuring and provisions for debtor in
possession financing.
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the lenders whose position is being subordinated.8 DIP financing
requests in initial orders should be confined to what is reasonably
necessary for the continued operation of the debtor corporation during a
"brief but realistic period on an urgent basis."9 The granting of postcommencement financing may allow a corporation to keep operating in
order to retain value while trying to negotiate a workout with creditors.
For stakeholders, such as workers, trade creditors, or local governments,
it may also result in preservation of their investments, at least for the
period that a restructuring plan is being formulated.' 0 According superpriority financing has also been aimed at ensuring compliance with
The court, in
environmental obligations, in the public interest."
balancing interests, will weigh the possibility of a going-concern solution
that potentially creates long-term upside value for numerous
stakeholders, with the risk of further depletion of value that may be able
to satisfy claims on a short-term basis.12 This balancing of interest and
prejudice is at the heart of most financing judgments. Notwithstanding
these potential benefits to all stakeholders, absent careful scrutiny of the
terms of the financing agreement, granting access to short-term capital
can increase the risk of harm to stakeholders if the terms approved by the
court lead to a restructuring plan that prejudices their interests more than
a liquidation outcome.
There was a growing practice in the five years preceding 2008 in
Canada of arranging DIP financing in an amount far in excess of what
the debtor corporation anticipated needing, ostensibly to increase market
8. Re Skydome Corp. (1998), 16 C.B.R. (4th) 118 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial
List]) at 5; Re Royal Oak Mines Inc. (1999), 1999 CarswellOnt 792 (Ont. Gen. Div.
[Commercial List]) 22; Re United Used Auto & Truck Parts Ltd. (1999), 12 C.B.R.
(4th) 144 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]), affirmed (2000), [2000] B.C.J. No. 409, 16 C.B.R.
(4th) 141 (B.C. C.A.), leave to appeal allowed but appeal discontinued (2000), [2000]
S.C.C.A. No. 142.
9. Re Royal Oak Mines Inc. (1999), 6 C.B.R. (4th) 314 (Ont. Gen. Div.
[Commercial List]).
10. Janis Sarra, Governance and Control: The Role of Debtor-in-Possession
Financing under the CCAA, in ANNUAL REVIEW OF INSOLVENcY LAW, 2004, 119-172
(Carswell, 2005).
11. Re Royal Oak Mines Inc. (2000), 2000 CarswellOnt 3686 (Ont. S.C.J.
[Commercial List]).
12. Canadian courts have previously held that there are five principles operating in
the court's consideration of applications for DIP financing and priming charges: adequate
notice of DIP financing and priming requests, so that creditors can fully assess the impact
of DIP financing decisions; sufficient disclosure; timeliness of the request; balancing the
prejudice to creditors and other stakeholders; and the principle of granting priority
financing as an extraordinary remedy. Courts apply these principles in an effort to find
the optimal balancing of prejudice in the exercise of their jurisdiction to grant DIP
financing or other priority charges. The court must weigh the likely risks against the
likely gains of authorizing such financing; with a view to creating certainty in credit
transactions while meeting the objectives of insolvency legislation.
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confidence and provide creditors with some assurance that their postfiling claims would be met. However, the size of the DIP facility
generated increased up-front fees, higher costs associated with
heightened reporting requirements to the DIP lender, and, in some cases,
more control elicited as a condition of providing the financing.13 As the
market for DIP financing started to increase, the competition meant that
the margin on a DIP facility itself was not that great, but the DIP lender
made its real profit on the up-front fees.
Canadian courts have granted "Drip DIPs," that require the debtor
to come before the court on notice to creditors each time it seeks to draw
down another tranche of funds. The only exposure of the DIP lender is
the amount already advanced, and creditors have more information on
which to assess their positions as the process unfolds. Gradual release of
funds in the first few weeks or months can generate a higher degree of
accountability. Where stakeholders are provided with timely information
of the financing requirements and the opportunity to provide their views
to the court on the necessity of the draw down, it can act as a temper on
any managerial slack that has arisen from a generous DIP facility. 14 Drip
DIPs frequently are structured so that the debtor can draw down
according to an anticipated schedule; hence it is not necessary to come
back before the court if there is no deviation from the schedule that
would have adverse consequences for other creditors.
Where the lender is a pre-existing secured lender, such as a specific
asset secured creditor, the creditor's claim is often unaffected by a
reorganization proceeding, and the creditor may not support additional
financing as it means delay in realizing on its claim. However, in some
cases, subordinated pre-filing lenders may benefit from financing that is
aimed at satisfying senior secured claims at the outset or early in the
process, as it may enhance their position in the hierarchy of claims.
There is a question of whether post-commencement financing
should be granted at all when the circumstances indicate that the
financing would consume considerable resources and that the debtor has
a questionable ability to successfully negotiate a plan. The court may
decline post-commencement financing on a primed basis where the
debtor seeks only to prolong the period before an inevitable liquidation,
or where there is no possibility for a plan. The challenge is to ensure that
such a decision is not premature such that creditors become unwilling to
come to the negotiation table. The cases that have declined to grant the

13. Sarra,supra note 10, at 150.
14. Andrew Kent, Alex MacFarlane and Adam Maerow, "Who is in Control? A
Commentary on Canadian DIP Lending Practices," May 2004, available at
http://www.mcmillan.ca/Upload/Publication/DIP%20Financing%2Paper%/2Ovl0.pdf.
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financing have relied in part on the fact that there were not ongoing
operations, and employees and trade supply relations to protect during an
interim period.' 5 For example, the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench
denied the application of a real estate company that had applied for
Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act protection as it was unable to
make all of its mortgage payments as a result of the economic downturn
and defaults on leases.' 6 The application was opposed by the majority of
first mortgagees, who wanted to proceed with their foreclosure remedies.
The Court concluded that it was not appropriate to grant relief; it
appeared highly unlikely that any compromise or arrangement would be
acceptable to creditors; the proposed costs were not appropriate given the
circumstances; and there were not a large number of employees or
significant unsecured debt in relation to the secured debt.
Thus, the policy issues in post-commencement financing can be
summarized as the need to appropriately balance the interests of all
creditors against the potential for a successful restructuring, with a view
to the costs and benefits arising from the particular form and conditions
of the proposed financing agreement. These policy issues arose first in
the courts' exercise of their discretionary decision-making concerning
DIP financing, and are now the subject of new Canadian legislative
provisions.
A.

CodificationofDIP Financingin CanadianInsolvency Legislation

DIP financing in Canada was initially hotly contested based on
jurisdictional grounds, given the previous lack of statutory language;
however, it became widely endorsed by the courts as a measure to "keep
the lights on" during the period of negotiations for a restructuring plan.'
With the amendments to Canadian insolvency legislation effective
September 2009, the court's authority to authorize such financing was
codified in both the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act ("BIA") and
Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA"), both statutes
articulating criteria for assessing requests for financing on a primed

basis.18
15. Re Octagon Properties Group Ltd. (2009), 2009 CarswellAlta 1325, 2009 ABQB
500 (Alta. Q.B.); Re Shire International Real Estate Investments Ltd., 2010 CarswellAlta
234, 2010 ABQB 84 (Alta. Q.B.).
16. Re Octagon Properties Group Ltd. (2009), 2009 CarswellAlta 1325, 2009 ABQB
500 (Alta. Q.B.).
17. See for example, Re Royal Oak Mines Inc. (1999), 6 C.B.R. (4th) 314 (Ont. Gen.
Div. [Commercial List]). Re Indalex Ltd. (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 1998, 52 C.B.R.
(5th) 61 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); Re Conporec Inc. (2009), 2009 CarswellQue
2471 (Que. S.C.).
18. S. 11.2, CCAA; 2007, c. 36 proclaimed in force as of September 18, 2009.
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UNCITRAL has recommended that an insolvency law should
specify that the court may authorize the creation of a security interest
having priority over pre-existing security interests if specified conditions
are satisfied, including that existing secured creditors are given the
opportunity to be heard by the court; the debtor can prove that it cannot
obtain the finance in any other way; and the interests of the existing
secured creditors will be protected.1 9
The Canadian criteria have some similarities, but do not require the
debtor to establish that it can find no other financing, and do not require
the pre-filing secured creditor to be fully protected. The factors that the
court is to consider include, but are not limited to: the period during
which the company is expected to be subject to restructuring
proceedings; how the business is to be managed during the proceeding;
whether management has the confidence of the debtor's major creditors;
whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or
arrangement being made; the nature and value of the company's
property; whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result
of the charge; and the monitor's views. 2 0 The monitor in CCAA
proceedings is a court-appointed officer that assists the court and parties
in the restructuring process, and it can provide an impartial view of the
need for, and efficacy of, any DIP financing requests.
The new statutory criteria for DIP financing essentially codify the
tests used previously by Canadian courts but offer greater transparency
for creditors and other stakeholders that are not repeat players in
proceedings. The court is not restricted to consideration of only these
factors,2121 nor is it required to give them equal weight and consideration. 22
The court has approved post-commencement financing with a
corresponding charge where necessary to ensure that the business
enterprise of the debtor would continue to operate as a going concern
while it undergoes restructuring, having regard to the potential material
prejudice to creditors, the preservation of employment and the prospects
for a successful workout.2 3 The court has held that even if certain
creditors are materially affected by the DIP loan, the court must look to
the broader picture, and a compromise that the creditor may have to
19. UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (New York: United Nations,
2005), at 118.
20. Section 11.2(4), CCAA; Re White Birch Paper Holding Co., 2010 CarswellQue

1780 (Que. S.C.J.).
21. Re Mecachrome International Inc. (2009), 2009 CarswellQue 5141, [2009]
R.J.Q. 1306 (Que. S.C.); Re White Birch Paper Holding Co., 2010 CarswellQue 1780
(Que. S.C.J.); Re Canwest Global Communications Corp., (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt
6184 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).
22. Re White Birch Paper Holding Company, 2010 CarswellQue 2675 (Que. S.C.).
23. Id.
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accept can be outweighed by the positive effects of the financing on the
total business of the debtor.2 4
For example, in Re AbitibiBowater, the Qu6bec Superior Court
approved a DIP financing facility where the benefits of the financing to
all creditors, shareholders and employees outweighed the potential
prejudice to some creditors.2 5 There was an urgent need for the financing
due to a serious lack of liquidity to meet payroll or key suppliers'
deliveries; the term of the financing was relatively short; there was a
reasonable prospect of a successful restructuring; and most of the
stakeholders and the monitor supported the proposed financing. In
stabilizing the continued operations of the debtor, the Court held that the
financing potentially added value to the objecting term lenders' claims
and the opportunity to contest future borrowing alleviated in part the
prejudice suffered by the term lenders. The Court also observed that in
the current credit market, DIP financing would not be available absent a
priming charge; however it reduced the amount of the charge for the DIP
facility as the Court was not satisfied with the explanation provided to
support the amount sought.
How creditors bear the costs of post-commencement financing is an
important question. The Canadian court has approved allocation of
financing charges based on the following principles: that all secured
creditors should contribute to the cost of restructuring; a strict accounting
on a cost-benefit basis was impractical and not necessary or desirable for
allocation purposes; security arrangements and priorities should not be
readjusted as part of this process; the proportion each creditor should be
allocated need not be equal; and the allocation should be equitable, rather
than equal.26 The Court held that while it is unfair to ignore the degree
of potential benefit that each creditor might derive, the nature of
proceedings under the CCAA makes a strict accounting on a cost-benefit
basis impractical and ultimately defeating. 27
B.

CorporateGroups and Cross-BorderProceedings

The challenge for post-commencement financing becomes more
acute for debtors operating as a corporate group in multiple jurisdictions.
Often the related businesses have highly integrated financial systems and
interrelated debt and equity structures, yet the entities are registered in
24. Id.
25. Re AbitibiBowater Inc. (2009), 58 C.B.R. (5t) 62 (Que. S.C.).
26. Re Winnipeg Motor Express Inc, (2009), 2009 CarswellMan 383, 2009 MBQB
204 (Man. Q.B.).
27. Id. Where the allocation is primafacie fair, the onus is on an objecting creditor
to demonstrate that the proposal was unfair or prejudicial. The court relied heavily on the
monitor's expertise and involvement in approving the allocation.

590

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAw REVIEW

[Vol. 29:3

different jurisdictions with different statutory language covering postcommencement financing. The policy issue is whether and to what
degree can the assets of the group in one jurisdiction be used as part of
the financing in insolvency proceedings to the benefit of group members
in another jurisdiction.
Special purpose entities ("SPE") are often created within corporate
groups to manage risk in the acquisition and financing of specific
assets. 2 8
Corporate entities often have inter-entity financing
arrangements involving loans and guarantees. The supply relationships
between the entities may mean that there is short-term debt in the form of
receivables granted from one entity to another. A restructuring may not
be possible without a highly integrated workout strategy across multiple
jurisdictions; and it is the interim financing that may be particularly
challenging, given that different jurisdictions have different priorities and
different degrees of willingness to allow post-commencement financing.
In a number of jurisdictions, a significant method of enterprise group
financing is cross-guarantee financing, where each company within a
group guarantees the performance of the others. 2 9 UNCITRAL observes
that cross-guarantees can operate to reduce the regulatory burden on
companies by granting accounting and auditing relief to related entities,
operating as a form of voluntary contribution or pooling in the event that
one or more of the companies becomes financially distressed.30 One
advantage of this arrangement is that creditors can focus on the
consolidated position for those entities, rather than on the individual
financial statements of the wholly owned subsidiaries.
UNCITRAL suggests that insolvency laws should permit an
enterprise group member in insolvency proceedings to advance postcommencement finance to other enterprise group members subject to
insolvency proceedings; grant a security interest over its assets for postcommencement finance provided to another enterprise group member;
and provide a guarantee or other assurance of repayment for postcommencement finance provided to another enterprise group member.
The insolvency law should specify that such financing may be provided
where it is necessary for the continued operation of, or the preservation
of the value of, the enterprise group member; and where any harm to
creditors of that group member is likely to be offset by the benefit to be
28. UNCITRAL Working Group V (Insolvency Law), UNCITRAL Legislative
Guide on Insolvency Law, Treatment of enterprise groups in insolvency, 23 April 2010.
2.
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.90 and Addenda 1, November 2009 (A/CN.9/686).
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.92 and A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.92/Add. 1.
29. Id. at 29.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 37.
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derived from advancing financing or a security interest. 3 2 There should
be appropriate protection for the providers of post-commencement
finance and for those parties whose rights may be affected; and there
should be fair apportionment of the benefit and detriment associated with
the financing among all group members involved.
UNCITRAL
recommends a balancing of the interests of individual enterprise group
members with what is required for the reorganization of the group as a
whole.34 A solvent group member might have an interest in the financial
stability of related entities in order to ensure its own financial stability,
particularly where it is closely integrated with or reliant on insolvent
members for ongoing business activity. 35 UNCITRAL observes that the
interest of a group member providing finance may relate more to the
insolvency outcome for the group as a whole than to commercial
considerations of profit or short-term gains, especially where there is a
high degree of reliance between the businesses of the group members.3 6
The Nortel Networks case is one such example. 3 7 Issues include the
priority and extent to which inter-group financing should be allowed, the
extent to which it encumbers the assets of one entity in furtherance of the
restructuring of the entire corporate group, and how both secured and
unsecured creditors' interests are to be assessed in considering the
quantum and priority of the financing.
In Canada, one relatively new development is the approval of DIP
financing charges that encumber assets of Canadian debtor entities to
meet financing needs of related entities in the United States. The genesis
of this change is both the increasingly interrelated nature of global
business enterprises and the lack of financing during the worst of the
financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. The downside risk for such financing
is that Canadian creditors that may have had access to the value of those
assets may lose that claim. The potential upside is the preservation of the
business, jobs and trade relationships, which overall may be more
valuable.
For example, in Re InterTAN Canada Ltd., the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice approved a DIP financing facility, the terms of which
required the debtor to provide security for the borrowings of its US
32. Id. at 31.
33. UNCITRAL Working Group V (Insolvency Law), UNCITRAL Legislative
Guide on Insolvency Law, Treatment of enterprise groups in insolvency, 23 April 2010.
2.
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.90 and Addenda 1, November 2009 (A/CN.9/686).
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.92 and A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.92/Add.1, at 37.
34. Id. at 32.
35. Id. at 32.
36. Id. at 36.
37. Re Nortel Networks Corp. (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4467, (2009), 56 C.B.R.
(5") 74 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

592

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:3

parent in its Chapter 11 filing.3 8 The Court expressed concern about
inadequate notice to creditors regarding the request to use the debtor's
assets as a basis for obtaining finance for a related entity, and observed
that if debtors are going to request such extreme relief on an initial
application, with little or no notice, it is up to the applicant to establish
the evidentiary basis for the requested relief. In the absence of such
evidence, parties should have no expectation that the court will grant
such extraordinary relief. Justice Morawetz did approve the DIP facility
on the basis that the potential upside of a going concern operation was
preferable to liquidation, notwithstanding that provisions of the DIP
facility effectively transferred assets from the Canadian debtor to another
member of the enterprise group. He took into account the prospect of
continued going concern operations; the continued employment of over
3,000 individuals; the benefits of continued operation for other thirdparty stakeholders; the fact that certain creditor groups would be largely
unaffected by the CCAA proceedings; and the creation of an unsecured
creditors' charge that provided a degree of protection to them.
In Nortel Networks, Canadian and US courts approved a series of
agreements between the inter-related Nortel entities that provided the
debtors with ongoing funding. 39 The Canadian court held that the scope
of review must take account of the complex and interrelated funding
agreements that had been developed over a period of years. It was
appropriate to place reliance on the views of the monitor who had the
benefit of intensive involvement for over a year, and to take account of
extensive negotiations among the debtors and creditors. The Court was
satisfied that the financing was fair and reasonable, and that the financial
stability of the Canadian debtor was in jeopardy and would not improve
without the approval of financing.
Cross-border entities and cross-border guarantees extend not only to
interim financing but have been used as mechanisms to finance a sale
process. For example, the Canadian Court approved a DIP facility in
which US debtor entities advanced financing to Canadian debtors. 4 0 The
US debtors were granted a charge over the assets of the Canadian debtor,
limited to the amount of inter-company advances. The DIP facility was
predicated on the US debtors' carrying out a sales process that would
include the marketing of the businesses and assets of both sets of debtors,
38. Re InterTAN Canada Ltd. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 8040, 49 C.B.R. (5th) 248;
additional reasons at (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 687, 49 C.B.R. (5th) 260 (Ont. S.C.J.
[Commercial List]).
39. Re Nortel Networks Corp., 2010 CarswellOnt 1044 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial
List]).
40. Re Eddie Bauer of Canada Inc. (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 3657 (Ont. S.C.J.
[Commercial List]).
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to be subject to approval by both the CCAA court and the US bankruptcy
court. Both courts were satisfied that the proposed DIP facility and
creation of the inter-company charge were appropriate in the
circumstances.
In another proceeding, an extensive process to obtain new debt
financing had been undertaken, and the debtors, having thoroughly
canvassed the market, did not have any satisfactory alternative financing
arrangements available. The Ontario Superior Court approved a crossborder DIP facility that provided that the Canadian debtors would
guarantee loans to the US debtors and vice versa.41 The Court was
satisfied that the business was fully integrated, making it impracticable in
the existing credit environment to secure alternate financing on a standalone basis. The Court held that the successful restructuring of the
Canadian and US entities appeared to be inextricably intertwined and
that financing was needed to continue day-to-day operations.
In granting a motion for DIP financing in another proceeding, the
Ontario court was satisfied that secured creditors had received notice; the
amount of the facility was appropriate having regard to the debtor's cashflow statement; management had the confidence of the major creditors;
there was no material prejudice to any of the creditors that would arise
from the granting of the DIP charge; and the facility would enhance the
prospects of a restructuring. 42 The Court held that continued timely
supply of US services was necessary to preserve going concern value and
that commencement of Chapter 15 proceedings to have the CCAA
proceedings recognized as "foreign main proceedings" was a prerequisite
to the DIP facility.
III. STALKING HORSE PROCEEDINGS
Given the ongoing problems with credit availability, other means of
post-commencement financing have been pursued, including the sale of
some of the debtor's assets. However, these sale processes may raise
issues of fairness to stakeholders and the misuse of inside information
similar to those raised by mergers and acquisitions outside of an
insolvency proceeding. Recently, a number of insolvency proceedings
have used various bidding or auction techniques to sell all or part of the
enterprise to raise both post-commencement and exit financing. Stalking
horse proceedings are one such strategy. The term "stalking horse"

41. Re Smurfit-Stone Container Inc. (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 391, 50 C.B.R. (5th)
71 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). The court approval limited the amount of borrowings
under the facility pending further order of both the U.S. and the CCAA court.
42. Re Canwest Global Communications Corp., (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 6184
(Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).
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comes originally from hunters using a horse to serve as a screen as
camouflage when they stalked their prey.43 In the insolvency context, it
is used to signify a situation where the debtor makes an agreement with a
potential bidder for a sale of the debtor's assets or business, and that
agreement forms part of a process whereby an auction or tendering
process is conducted to see if there is a better and higher bidder that will
result in greater returns to creditors. The premise is that the stalking
horse has undertaken considerable due diligence in determining the value
of the debtor corporation and that other potential bidders can rely, to an
extent, on the value attached by that bidder based on that due diligence.
"Stalking horse auction" processes have been used recently in
Canadian-US cross-border proceedings, in part as a response to the
tightening of credit and the need to generate higher bids for the value of
some or all of the assets or business. In an auction, a preliminary bid by
the stalking horse bidder is disclosed to the market and becomes the base
amount that parties can then outbid, driving up the price and hence the
value to meet creditors' claims. The stalking horse bidder in an
insolvency proceeding enters the process knowing that it may not be the
eventual purchaser. Hence it negotiates a price for its participation and
its due-diligence activities, usually in the form of a "break fee," which it
will receive if it is not ultimately successful in its bid for the debtor
company. In this sense, it is similar to a white knight in a takeover
transaction, in that the size of the break fee must be large enough to be
auction-generating and small enough not to be auction-inhibiting.
In Nortel Networks, the Canadian and US courts approved a bidding
procedure and asset-sale agreement for the purposes of conducting a
"stalking horse" bidding process, including a break fee and expense
reimbursement.4 The hearing was conducted by video conference with
the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in accordance with
the provisions of a cross-border protocol previously approved by the
courts. The Canadian court held that it had jurisdiction under the CCAA
to approve a sales process in the absence of a formal plan of compromise

43. The Online Etymology Dictionary, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?l=
s&p=55.
44. Re Nortel Networks Corp. (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4467, (2009), 56 C.B.R.
(5') 74 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). See also Re Eddie Bauer of Canada Inc. (2009),
57 C.B.R. (5h) 241 (Ont. S.C.J.). Previously, the US bankruptcy court has held that it
will take the following factors into account in determining whether to approve a break
fee: whether the fee correlated with a maximization of value to the estate; whether the
request is arm's length; the degree of stakeholder support; whether the proposed fee is a
fair and reasonable percentage of the proposed purchase price; any potential chilling
effect on the market; the existence of safeguards; and whether there is an adverse impact
on any opposing unsecured creditors; Re Hupp Industries, 140 B.R. 191 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1992).
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or arrangement and a creditor vote, on the basis that the CCAA must be
given a broad and liberal interpretation to achieve its objectives. The
Court held that a sale by the debtor that preserved the business as a going
concern was consistent with those objectives. Factors to be considered
included, but were not limited to: is a sale transaction warranted at this
time; will the sale benefit the whole "economic community"; do any of
the debtor's creditors have a bonafide reason to object to the sale of the
business; and is there a better viable alternative?
In another proceeding, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
approved a stalking-horse auction process in a CCAA proceeding where
the proposed stalking horse, which was an insider and related party, had
been scrutinized by the financial advisors, the independent committee of
the board and the monitor. 45 With respect to a contested break fee, the
Court held that the fee was a business decision that had been considered
by the debtor and key creditor groups and that the amount of the break
fee was consistent with break fees that had been approved in other
proceedings.4 6 In the circumstances of this case, the court found it
unnecessary to substitute its business judgment for that of the applicants.
Canadian courts have generally supported sealed competitive
bidding processes that allow submission of independent, self-contained
bids, finding that bidders are entitled to fair compliance with such
procedures. 47 The courts have supported insolvency professionals
rejecting referential bids on the basis that they would frustrate a sealed
competitive bidding process, as it would create unfairness if a party
could introduce into the sealed bid system elements of a public auction
without any risk of being outbid by another party. Where parties
intended a fixed bid process, the court was satisfied that the receiver's
rejection of a referential bid in favour of another bid was commercially
fair and reasonable in the circumstances and should be accepted.48
Dowdall and Dietrich have argued that stalking-horse proceedings
conducted by the debtor and not a neutral court-appointed officer raise
concerns about the process, in that the stalking horse can exert
considerable control over timelines, making them so tight that other
bidders do not have a meaningful opportunity to undertake their due

45. Re Brainhunter Inc., 2009 CarswellOnt 8207 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]),
adopting the tests used in Re Nortel Networks Corp. (2009), 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont.

S.C.J. [Commercial List]),
4 6. Id.
47. Fifth Third Bank v. MPI Packaging Inc., 2010 CarswellOnt 29 (Ont. S.C.J.
[Commercial List]).
48. Id.
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diligence.49 Stalking horse bidders may insist on restrictive terms in
respect of who may be treated as a qualified bidder. Management may
also have a conflict of interest where they are negotiating key employee
retention packages, bonuses or other perquisites; and while these are
ostensibly subject to some control in terms of the court's approval, the
tight timeliness may create pressure to approve such plans, even where
the court might otherwise have concems.so
These concerns may be difficult to discern where the issues are
complex and time is of the essence. However, courts have indicated that
they will scrutinize such transactions. In Re Mecachrome International
Inc., Justice Gascon of the Qu6bec Superior Court dismissed a motion to
approve a plan-funding agreement proposed by the DIP lenders to fund a
proposed CCAA plan, under which the DIP lenders would acquire all the
shares of the Canadian debtor company in exchange for payment,
including some funds to be directed to unsecured creditors to recover
approximately 12% of their claims.51 The Court held that the CCAA is
aimed at enabling a debtor company, with the support of its creditors, to
weather its financial difficulties and continue to operate in the interests
of parties and society in general, and that a plan that is supported by
creditors must be achieved at the best cost and under the best possible
conditions for the creditors that inevitably suffer the consequences.
Here, the fundamental goal of the CCAA in the circumstances was best
served by refusing to approve the plan-funding agreement. The Court
held that the cumulative effect of the absence of any legitimate and open
process to canvass funding proposals; the narrow definition of what
constituted a superior proposal under the plan-funding agreement and the
lack of flexibility given to the board of directors to qualify a superior
proposal as superior; the chilling effect of the high break fee; and the
lack of evidence of a value maximizing process, all worked against the
objective of a sufficient, transparent and open process. As well, the
process contemplated by the proposed funding agreement would usurp
the exercise of the right to vote belonging to creditors, and the agreement
unnecessarily tied the hands of the Canadian debtor with respect to
potential consideration of available alternative solutions that could
benefit creditors. The Court held that the funding agreement closely
resembled a stalking horse bid process with no real canvassing of the
market. While the DIP lenders may have had a head start in any
acquisition because of the inclusion of an exclusivity clause of limited
49. Daniel R. Dowdall and Jane 0. Dietrich, "Do Stalking Horses Have a Place in
Intra-Canadian Insolvencies?", in Janis Sarra, ed., Annual Review of Insolvency Law,
2005 (Toronto: Carswell, 2006) at 8.
50.

Id.

51.

Re Mecachrome International Inc. (2009), 58 C.B.R. (5") 49 (Que. S.C.).
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duration in the DIP financing agreement, the Court held that such a
clause did not, and could not, have the impact of relieving the Canadian
debtors and the monitor of their duties, in terms of fairness, transparency,
and openness towards all stakeholders. The Court found that the
proposed break fee of 4.5% was too high, the evidence before it
suggesting that the average break fee in a merger or acquisition is about
2.9%; and that the debtor had failed to show that the break fee was
reasonable or adequately related to the costs of the DIP lender or its risk.
The Court noted that while the approval of the monitor is an important
factor, it is not decisive in and of itself.52
There is also the issue of the degree to which the DIP financier is,
through terms of its facility, determining outcomes in other aspects of the
CCAA proceeding. For example, in Re AbitibiBowater Inc., the interim
funding was provided on the basis that the funds could not be used
towards the payment of special contributions to pension plans; and as a
result, the Court concluded that it was necessary to suspend the special
contributions to the pension plan. 3 While the DIP lender should be able
to negotiate the terms of the facility, the courts need to be cognizant of
the degree to which such terms will bind the court in future decisions.
Tighter credit conditions have given DIP lenders greater leverage and the
ability to exert more control. An alternative process that may offer better
results for existing creditors is a credit-bid process.
CreditBids

A.

A very recent development in financing workouts of insolvent
businesses is the use of credit bidding, which has occurred in cases such
as Canwest and White Birch.54 A credit bid allows a creditor to
essentially use its debt to bid for the equity of the company, often in a
stalking horse process. Although there is no express language in the
CCAA that allows credit bidding, as there is in the US Bankruptcy Code,
Canadian courts have accepted credit bids as a reasonable means of
financing the workout. There are a number of issues raised by this new
financing. First, a creditor may have access to considerable information
as a result of its position as a senior secured lender; thus, it is important
to ensure that any bidding process is fair and transparent in terms of the
financial and other disclosures. If the bidding creditor is also the DIP
financier, it may pressure the debtor for a truncated process that does not
52.

Id.

53. Re AbitibiBowater Inc. (2009), 2009 CarswellQue 4329 (Que. S.C.).
54. Re Canwest Global Connunications Corp., (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 6184
(Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); Re White Birch Paper Holding Co., 2010 CarswellQue
1780 (Que. S.C.J.).
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generate a true market for bids; or it may pressure for a lower value to be
attributed to the business, given that pricing is difficult to determine at
the point of insolvency. There is an important role for the monitor and
the court in ensuring that the process is fair, that information is available
that allows competitive bids to come forward, and that any conflicts of
interest are controlled as much as possible. While credit bids may offer a
helpful alternative to financing a workout, particularly in the tighter postfinancial crisis credit market, their further development must be
undertaken in a manner that ensures that the integrity of the CCAA
process is maintained.
In the Canwest case, the credit bid was topped by a junior lender
working in conjunction with other parties, generating increased value.
Unlike new parties to insolvency proceedings, pre-filing secured
creditors were already privy to confidential information, and generally
such lenders are entitled to see other bids and proposals. The challenge
was how to create a transparent and fair process that was truly open
enough to generate other bids where appropriate. Another case upheld a
creditor agreement that had provided for creditor bids, although the
judgment did not expressly address the issues associated with credit bids.
The Ontario Court approved a sale transaction involving transfer of the
business and sale of real property of the applicants in both Canada and
the US under a court-approved marketing process.55 The Ontario debtor
operated from businesses located in Canada and the United States. The
selection of purchaser was based on a thorough analysis of all of the
financial and commercial terms presented in all of the bids, and was
recommended by the monitor and approved by the first lien lenders
56
steering committee and the independent directors committee.
A 2007
inter-creditor agreement ("ICA") was found to be binding on the group
of companies, including a provision that the first lienholders could credit
bid their debt. The Ontario Superior Court of Justice found that by its
terms and the definition of "bankruptcy code" in the ICA, the parties
recognized that Canadian or US insolvency law might apply. Justice
Campbell held that once a process has been put into place by court order
for the sale of assets of a failing business, that process should be
To permit an
honoured, excepting extraordinary circumstances.
"invitation" to reopen that process not only would destroy the integrity of
the process, but would likely doom the transaction that had been

55. Re Grant Forest Products Inc. (2010), 2010 CarswellOnt 2445 (Ont. S.C.J.
[Commercial List]). Objections were raised by the subordinate secured creditor who
questioned the jurisdiction of the court to convey real property assets located in the US.
56. Id. The second lien lenders had been consulted, and their views and questions
were taken into account in the final selection of purchaser.
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The Court was satisfied that, by operation of the credit
achieved.
agreement, the first lienholders were entitled to exercise their remedies
and the Canadian court had jurisdiction to provide the relief requested.
The US caselaw on credit bids is extensive and has highlighted a
number of policy issues in respect of this tool for generating postcommencement and exit financing. As Canadian parties develop these
strategies, it will be important to study some of the problems that have
arisen in the US context in terms of transparency and fairness of the
process.
IV. CIRCLING VULTURES AND ROGUE WHITE KNIGHTS

Traditional pre-commencement creditors who offer postcommencement financing are seen to have a stake in the long-term
success of the business. However, constraints on credit granting by these
institutions have lessened their ability to finance restructuring of
insolvent companies. Other sources of financing may not have the same
incentives in a restructuring proceeding. Is this shift in incentives a
matter that should concern policymakers or the courts?
Distressed debt purchasers, often called vulture funds, have
increasingly used strategic purchases to assert control in restructuring
proceedings, by buying up debt across multiple classes at a discounted
value or buying in sufficient quantity to obtain an effective veto over
particular proposals and hence influence the outcome. Generally,
Canadian courts have not been concerned with debt purchase
transactions that may offer liquidity for trade suppliers, banks and other
traditional creditors by creating a market for their devalued claims during
insolvency proceedings. 59 Distressed debt purchasers offer creditors an
opportunity for early exit and in some cases can lend their expertise to
the development of viable business plans. Such lenders may also provide
post-commencement financing such that the debtor obtains some
57. Id., which was the product of the marketing process that was not only approved
by the Ontario Court but not objected to by any party when it was initiated. The
aggregate consideration being paid by the Canadian purchaser for the transferred assets
and the U.S. purchasers for the Grant US Partnership assets was $403 million, subject to
adjustment. It was urged that the proposed structure would maximize the value of the
Grant U.S. Partnership assets.
58. Id. They may then release their security over the assets to be transferred in
connection with the exercise of their remedies and by doing so, the security of the second
lienholders over the transferred assets would be automatically and simultaneously
released. Campbell J. accepted that the effect of the transaction may indirectly be a
transfer of US real property assets and the release of a security over them of the second
lienholders. The effect of the transaction was such that the claims of local creditors of
the business of the US mills remained unaffected.
59. Janis Sarra, DistressedDebt Purchasersin CanadianRestructuringProceedings,
INSOL Newsletter, April, 2007.
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financial breathing space in which to devise a going-forward strategy to
address its insolvency. Canadian courts do not generally distinguish in
insolvency proceedings between creditors' claims acquired through
normal credit transactions and creditors' claims acquired at a discounted
value at the point of a firm's financial distress.
Certain equity sponsors may organize their strategy to shift control
early in the process towards their interests. They buy up the debt across
classes at a severely discounted value and provide the postcommencement financing under stringent controls. Alternatively, they
can buy most of the debt from a single class but purchase that debt
through several entities and thus control the vote of the class through the
"head count" numbers as well as the total value of claims. This strong
creditor position then allows them to put in the equity bid and to be
assured that it is accepted across the classes of creditors. While parties
are entitled to conduct their affairs to maximize value, this strategy
creates new challenges for the court in exercising its supervisory powers
in terms of its ability to balance stakeholder interests.
The limited pool of DIP lenders often provides them with
considerable bargaining power in negotiations for a post-commencement
financing agreement. Given the thinness of the post-commencement
financing market, lenders have been able to secure both extremely
favourable financing terms, as well as extensive control rights in the
provisions of the financing agreement. An example was the Teleglobe
DIP financing agreement, in which the DIP lender was expressly given
the right to approve any form of order coming before the court.o It is a
normal practice of a DIP lender to protect its interest, but such control
rights can also serve to prevent the debtor from considering strategies or
bringing motions that better serve the interests of multiple stakeholders.
Canadian courts have endorsed these financing agreements because they
have been persuaded that the agreement is the only realistic means for
the debtor corporation to keep operating while it attempts to negotiate a
viable restructuring plan with its creditors. Often the court is advised
that all the jobs will be lost if the DIP agreement is not approved.
Control terms in a DIP agreement can create serious risk of prejudice to
stakeholders. For example, the DIP lender can threaten to declare default
on the agreement if particular motions are brought before the court or if
the debtor takes particular positions where creditors bring motions.
Other provisions can specify default of the DIP financing agreement if
the court makes particular orders. The growth of distressed debt
investors in insolvency workouts has created new pressure for timely
60. In the matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and Teleglobe Inc.
(May 15, 2002), Doc. 02-CL-4528 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).
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turnaround and workout plans that generate short-term returns on their
investments and sometimes little interest in the long-term viability of the
business enterprise. 61
If the debtor is able to secure capital from existing senior operating
lenders, the governance structure may not change, except that the lender
imposes more stringent monitoring and, in some cases, control rights on
the use of the financing. Governance of the debtor business enterprise
plays a significant role in the potential success and, hence, upside value
that may be generated by a successful workout, and post-commencement
financing has been utilized as a tool in Canada, the US and elsewhere to
Where creditors have confidence in the
influence governance.62
oversight and management of the debtor corporation and they determine
that a going-concern outcome to the insolvency proceeding maximizes
value for them, they are likely to provide the DIP facility. 3 However,
where the party acquiring the distressed debt engages in abuse of its
position or lacks good faith in its dealings with parties to an insolvency
proceeding, the court may limit the ability of that creditor to veto an
outcome to the proceedings, in keeping with the overall objectives of
insolvency legislation. Canadian courts may consider the motives and
conduct of a distressed debt purchaser where there is evidence of abuse
of process or a lack of good-faith dealings.
To date, there have been few judgments that have addressed this
type of behaviour. The court has observed that there are different types
of vulture funds, some that have objectively concluded that the debtor
has value and hence they purchase debt such that there is increased
liquidity in the market for those who have a desire to cut their losses, and
other vulture funds that are "somewhat more antisocial and may in
certain circumstances be said to hold the affected parties to ransom."6
The Court in Curragh held that while legally there is no difference in
these claims, the court may question the effect on those traditional
creditors who had put 100 cents on the dollar into the situation only to be
caught in a credit crunch, and those who have "speculated" at pennies on
the pound knowing that the situation is risky.65 In Re CanadianAirlines
Corp., the Alberta Court held that the good faith of a distressed investor
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Existing creditors can often make a decision on post-commencement financing
quickly, given that they have already acquired knowledge of the debtor's financial
position and may have sector-specific information that has informed previous credit
decisions. Hence, they may have lower transaction costs in conducting the due diligence
required in post-commencement financing decisions.
64. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs & Northern Development) v. Curragh Inc.
(1994), 1994 CarswellOnt 3851 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) 14.
65. Id.
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may be a factor in considering approval of a CCAA plan.66 There, the
creditor continued to purchase a substantial amount of highly distressed
debt when it was well aware of the financial deterioration of the debtor in
order to leverage its position in the negotiations for a workout. Canadian
courts will consider the motives of distressed debt purchasers in
weighing the benefits and prejudice in particular restructuring cases.
Where the DIP lender is not a pre-filing creditor, it may have
different timelines in terms of satisfying its claims. As a consequence,
the DIP creditor may encourage the debtor corporation to consider
liquidation prematurely, when there is still value in the debtor that could
accrue to junior secured and unsecured creditors. Similarly, it may press
for a going-concern sale to third parties when a sale to existing creditors
would satisfy a greater percentage of claims or produce less prejudice to
claims overall. A new post-commencement finance lender may have
little concern about the outcome of the insolvency proceeding, since its
claims are fully protected by the priming charge and it has no pre-filing
debt that may be underwater. Given the controls that it extracts in the
financing agreement, the post-commencement financing lender may
unduly pressure the debtor corporation to consider its interests above
those of other creditors. It may also pressure the debtor company to
engage in particular bargaining or litigious conduct that unnecessarily
prejudices pre-filing creditors and dictates the outcome of bargaining,
confident that the size of the facility and the conditions under which it
was granted will prevail. Since an objective of Canadian CCAA
proceedings is to facilitate a process whereby the debtor is given the
opportunity to devise a viable plan of arrangement, the courts should
consider the potential prejudice to these objectives where DIP lenders
have imposed control rights that prevent directors and officers from
decision-making in the interests of the firm and all its stakeholders. 68
In Canada, the debtor corporation remains in control during the
workout process, as the legislative scheme envisions, but not necessarily
the directors and officers, who might be replaced or encouraged to
resign. The ability of directors and officers to bargain for the terms of
the DIP facility may allow them more room to negotiate overall with
66. Re Canadian Airlines Corp. (2000), 20 C.B.R. (4th) 1, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9 (Alta.
Q.B.) 105.
67. Re Unifor&t Inc. (2002), 40 C.B.R. (4th) 251, [2003] R.J.Q. 161 (Que. S.C.),
leave to appeal to Que. C.A. refused (2002), 40 C.B.R. (4th) 281(Que. C.A.); Re Uniforet
Inc. (2003), 43 C.B.R. (4th) 254 (Que. S.C.), leave to appeal to Que. C.A. refused (2003),
44 C.B.R. (4th) 158 (Que. C.A.); leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (2004), 329 N.R. 194
(S.C.C.).
68. Janis Sarra, "Governance and Control: The Role of Debtor-in-Possession
Financing under the CCAA," Annual Review of Insolvency Law, 2004 (Carswell, 2005)
119-172.
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other stakeholders in finding the most appropriate plan of arrangement or
compromise. The difficulty is where there is a lack of confidence in
governance by the vast majority of creditors, but the DIP facility has the
effect of entrenching the directors and officers. In some cases, corporate
officers negotiate a specific provision that the debtor cannot change
management and that such a change would be considered a default of the
DIP agreement. Creditors are not given full access to the terms of the
agreement and, thus, do not know of the existence of such terms at the
point that the court endorses the DIP agreement. 69 The control issue in
respect of DIP lenders has become important because the market for such
lenders has been particularly thin since autumn 2008.
Hence, while distressed debt lenders have often provided needed
capital, their ability to purchase at a discounted value and their short term
profit horizon can sometimes result in workouts that are not aimed at
maximizing overall creditor value or at maximizing the overall value of
the business enterprise.
A.

Rogue White Knights

There is one case that illustrates some of the challenges of these
new financing strategies. In Minco-Division Construction Inc., a
distressed debt buyer had acquired the debt at a significant discount in
order to gain strategic control of the CCAA proceedings, and the Qu6bec
Superior Court held that it had jurisdiction to take into account the
circumstances under which distressed debt is acquired in insolvency
proceedings, especially in situations where the purchaser of such
distressed debt is pursuing a hidden agenda, is acting in bad faith, or
"tramples on the rights and expectations of others." 70 Minco-Division
Construction Inc. was an owner-developer of a mixed residential and
commercial condominium project under construction in Qubbec, which
filed for court protection under the CCAA, owing its creditors more than
$32 million. The first ranking Canadian bank granted DIP financing to
the debtor, to be used to fund the restructuring process and to maintain
and preserve the project. An interim receiver was appointed at the
bank's request, to determine whether it was prepared to fund the sums
required to complete construction. Over the course of the restructuring
process, the DIP loan grew to approximately $5 million. The debtors had
sought a "white knight" to buy out the bank's interest at a steep discount
69. Id.
70. Minco-Division Construction Inc. v. 9170-6929 Qu6bec Inc., [2007] Q.J. No.
449, 2007 CarswellQue 420, 29 C.B.R. (5th) 183 (Que. S.C. (Commercial Div.)), at 36;
leave to appeal to C.A. refused (29 January 2007), Montreal 500-09-017423-070 and
500-09-017419-078 (Que. C.A.).
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in order to allow the debtor to seek permanent financing to fund a plan of
arrangement and complete construction of its project. The white knight
was found among three shareholders and another party, and the debtor
had the expectation that the white knight would support the debtor's
restructuring efforts and not assert claims for the full value of the debt
that it had acquired. Disagreement among the principals resulted in the
white knight purchasing the rights of the mezzanine lender and numerous
construction liens in order to control the class of creditors and defeat the
debtor's restructuring efforts. The Court concluded that no party
intended that the white knight would take over the project; rather, its
initial role was confined to putting the bank claim in friendly hands while
looking for longer term financing to complete the project. The Court
held that white knights usually have an interest when intervening to save
a debtor from its creditors.7 1
In finding that the distressed debt buyer was a "rogue white knight,"
the Court held that "threatening to hijack the project and frustrate a plan
intended to bring a measure of relief to many creditors, including the
purchasers of units, does not square with the good faith conduct required
of contracting parties by article 1375 Code civile du Qudbec (CCQ)." 72
In finding the white knight's interest to be akin to litigious rights, the
Court ordered that the debtor could satisfy and discharge all claims
owing to the white knight by paying it, in the context of its plan of
arrangement, the amount that the white knight had itself paid to acquire
The Court further declared that on such
the subject debt claims.
payment by the debtors to the white knight, the debtors would be fully
discharged in respect of the claims and the white knight would be
deemed to have accepted Minco's plan of arrangement.
Hence on the particular facts of the case, the Qu6bec Court
exercised its general authority under insolvency legislation, drawing on
71. Here, the white knight investor was to have profited from its intervention at least
to the extent of 30% or a fifty-fifty basis; instead the white knight used its position to try
to take over the debtor on the strength of the giving in payment option contained in the
security provisions of the bank claims. It was in this sense that the Court described it as a
"rogue white knight."
72. Id. 36. Article 1375 specifies that "the parties shall conduct themselves in
good faith both at the time the obligation is created and at the time it is performed or
extinguished." In the circumstances, the Court decided to treat the claims of the white
knight as if they were "litigious rights" because that was what the parties intended at the
time that the bank debt was acquired at a discount. Id. 40. The Court drew from
"litigious right," which is described in article 1782 CCQ as: "A right is litigious when it
is uncertain, contested or contestable by the debtor, whether an action is pending or there
is reason to presume that it will become necessary entitling a debtor of such right to be
fully discharged by paying to the buyer the sale price, the costs related to the sale and
interest on the price . . . per article 1784 CCQ."
73. Id.

2011]

FINANCING INSOLVENCY RESTRUCTURINGS

605

concepts in the Qu6bec Civil Code to prevent an abuse of process by a
distressed-debt purchaser in the course of restructuring proceedings.
Having regard to the overall legislative objectives, the Court balanced
the interests of multiple creditors and limited the effects of the conduct of
the rogue white knight by limiting the value of its claims to the purchase
price of those claims plus costs of proceedings and interest costs. The
white knight did not suffer any financial loss, but it was not able to take
advantage of control rights to hijack the debtor's efforts for a viable
workout plan. The judgment in Minco-Division Construction Inc.
indicates that where a creditor provides financing to support a debtor's
restructuring and receives a control or veto position in the restructuring
process, the court may consider whether the creditor has acted in a
manner that is abusive, in bad faith or that is inconsistent with the
reasonable expectations of the debtor and other creditors at the time that
such funding was agreed upon. The competing consideration-that a
party to commercial agreement is entitled to pursue all legal rights that it
has acquired in the transaction-was subject to the considerations of
abuse, bad faith and inconsistency with reasonable expectations in the
context of the insolvency proceeding.
The willingness of the courts to intervene in the effects of
commercial transactions when they threaten the policy behind the
applicable insolvency legislation will be tested in the treatment of credit
Like the development of
derivatives in insolvency proceedings.
distressed debt markets, credit derivatives alter the economic incentives
and motivations of stakeholders in insolvency proceedings so that they
are unrecognizable in the traditional model of creditors' incentives in
insolvency proceedings.
V.

CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS AND THE EFFECT ON POSTCOMMENCEMENT FINANCING

While a full discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, financing
issues in insolvency proceedings cannot ignore the incentive effects of
credit default swaps and other credit derivatives on insolvency
restructuring proceedings.74 Credit derivatives are financial instruments
that allow parties to manage credit exposure.75 A credit derivative can be
74. For a discussion of credit derivatives, see Janis P. Sarra, Credit Derivatives
Market Design, Creating Fairness and Sustainability, Oct. 2008, (London: NFSM,
2008); http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1399630.
75. There are numerous kinds of credit derivatives, such as credit default swaps,
collateralized debt obligations ("CDOs"), full and index trades, and credit-linked notes.
Elizabeth Murphy, Janis Sarra and Michael Creber, "Credit Derivatives in Canadian
Insolvency Proceedings, 'The Devil will be in the Details,"' in Annual Review of
Insolvency Law, 2006 (Toronto: Carswell) at 187-234. Credit derivatives are classified as
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a privately negotiated agreement that explicitly shifts credit risk from one
party to the other; or it can be collateralized and housed within a special
purpose vehicle that resells debt contracts in various tranches at differing
prices, quality and risk. CDO can be cash-flow based, whereby the
vehicle issues its own financial instruments to finance purchase of debts
of different corporate entities, ensuring a fixed flow of loan repayments
that are used to pay investors in the various tranches; or CDO can be
synthetic, whereby the entity does not directly purchase debts but, rather,
enters into credit default swaps with a third party, creating synthetic
exposure to the debt of a number of corporate entities. 76 The most
common credit derivative, a credit default swap ("CDS"), is a credit
derivative contract in which one party, the "protection buyer," pays a
sum of money periodically to the "protection seller," usually referable to
the amount of protection provided by the contract. The protection
seller's obligation to pay arises on the occurrence of a credit event, most
frequently, the reference entity's failure to pay, bankruptcy, or
restructuring. The reference entity is not a party to the credit default
swap. The protection buyer that is a creditor of the reference entity
hedges the risk of default by that entity and takes on the risk of default
by the protection seller. The protection seller acquires the default risk of
the reference entity. Unlike insurance, the amount of compensation that
can be claimed under a credit derivative is not related to the actual losses
suffered by the protection buyer.7
Credit derivatives emerged in the early 1990s as a tool for banks to
manage their credit risk in respect of entities in which they had directly
invested through their lending activities, diversifying their risk on loan
default. In this respect, credit derivatives were initially effective in
cushioning the commercial banks' losses in notable cases such as Enron
and Parmalat. The market grew in less than two decades to an estimated
$62 trillion in outstanding credit default swaps alone at the end of 2007.
However, how such financial products work in practice bumps up against
insolvency restructuring regimes that allow for the development of viable
business plans that maximize enterprise value, preserve economic
activity and save jobs. The existence of credit derivatives may
either single- or multi-name (basket) products. Single-name credit derivatives are
targeted on the credit worthiness of a single reference entity. Multi-name products hedge
the risk of clustered defaults in a portfolio.
76. International
Swaps
and
Derivatives Association
(ISDA),
2006,
https://www.isdadocs.org/index.html.
77. Credit derivatives do not require either the protection seller or protection buyer
to actually hold an interest in the referenced asset; therefore the protection purchased by
the protection buyer can be more than, less than, or completely unconnected to its
underlying exposure to the reference entity. The protection buyer need not suffer an
actual loss to be eligible for compensation if a credit event occurs.

2011]

FINANCING INSOLVENCY RESTRUCTURINGS

607

perversely affect the motivation and behaviour of stakeholders of a
financially distressed entity, and may cause greater complexity and
uncertainty in a restructuring proceeding, as the real economic interests
of claimants are not transparent.
Commercial banks as operating lenders traditionally had a strong
role in monitoring the financial status of debtor companies, particularly
in the period leading up to insolvency. However, their hedging of risk
through derivatives has reduced the incentive to engage in oversight and
monitoring, notwithstanding that they are best placed through loan
covenants, access to information and in-house resources to engage in that
monitoring. While arguably that hedging of risk freed up capital for
other market participants seeking to borrow, the previous reliance that
creditors and other market participants often had on banks to engage in
such monitoring and the resultant signalling of a firm's financial health,
have diminished considerably. Given the weaker covenants under which
some debtor companies have financed their operations in recent years,
creditors may be unable to assert control over a debtor until there has
been a significant deterioration in its financial position, leading to
deferred liquidation or restructuring and consequent lower recovery to
creditors. It may no longer be feasible for the bank or other traditional
operating lender to take a lead in restructuring negotiations, given that
they have little or no remaining economic interest due to their credit
default swaps.
On insolvency, one moral hazard is that a creditor that has material
holdings of credit derivatives may have economic interests that
encourage it to cause a default to occur so that there is a credit event.
There are many factors that can affect the motivation and behaviour of
stakeholders in an insolvency restructuring, given their economic
interests; yet the creditor that has hedged its risk through a credit
derivative is arguably in a different position in the restructuring
proceeding, as there is a lack of transparency in respect of whether, in
fact, there are economic interests at risk. This observation is not to
suggest that credit derivatives drive behaviour in all cases; rather, it is a
growing phenomenon with the move to cash settlements and growth of
the market.
Under physical settlement of a CDS, the single institution from
which a debtor company borrowed and believed it had a relationship
results now in multiplicity of intermediaries and counterparties as CDS
settle.
The insolvent company may not even appreciate before
commencing a restructuring proceeding that it is a reference entity.
Cascading swaps means multiple rapid changes to who holds the claim,
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making it difficult for a debtor company to establish who has a claim.
It can suddenly be dealing with literally hundreds of new claimants.
Given settlement time lags where the protection seller with each physical
settlement becomes the party at the restructuring bargaining table, the
company's ability to devise a viable business plan can be hindered. This
effect is particularly problematic if there is urgency in devising a plan
because of a liquidity crisis or the need to maintain customer goodwill.
Physical settlement of multiple CDS has the potential to cause a
revolving door effect, making it hard for the company to build consensus
and gamer requisite support of creditors for a going forward viable
business-restructuring plan.79
A number of jurisdictions have granted exemptions for derivatives
from stays under insolvency laws because of the important public-policy
goal of global financial stability. However, the continued trading of
derivatives can cause further financial instability of the market in the
name of preserving liquidity and makes restructuring increasingly
difficult for particular debtors. In this respect, there is a tension between
two broader public-policy goals. On the one hand, Basel II capital rules
require the ability to terminate, net and realize on collateral in order to
allow institutions to take offsetting transactions into account for capital
purposes.8o If parties cannot close out, they face exposure on their offsetting trades, which can cause greater financial problems in the market.
On the other hand, the move towards rehabilitation in insolvency laws
globally is driven by the recognition that liquidation can often leave
value on the table that would have meant greater realizations for
subordinated secured creditors, unsecured creditors and employees, as
well as positive ripple effects in the local economy that can be realized
by preservation of economic activity in the community.
Many restructurings are almost completely negotiated before any
formal proceedings are taken, the UK being one such jurisdiction where
this practice occurs. Yet creditors who may be obliged to assign their
claims to protection sellers may not be able to bind their claims to an
agreed restructuring plan, removing a valuable public policy tool to
preserve economic activity.
Cash settlement of CDS poses different kinds of challenges for
restructuring. Unlike insurance, no title to the claim passes, and there is
no right of subrogation. With cash settlement, the protection buyer that
is a creditor of the insolvent company continues to be the party with the
78. Murphy, Sarra & Creber, supra note 75, at 10.
79. Id
80. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, InternationalConvergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework, June 2004,
http://www.bis.org/publbcbsl07.htm (Basel ll).
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legal claim, although at a reduced or eliminated financial exposure.
The debtor and other creditors have no notice or knowledge of the
reduced exposure. If the creditor is fully hedged, there will be little
incentive to engage in constructive negotiations for a restructuring plan.
This level of disengagement may be problematic for the restructuring.
While in some cases there can be an active market for derivatives during
a restructuring where credit-derivatives holders are also direct creditors
and take an active and constructive role in workout negotiations, the
converse can also occur. The financial institution with which the debtor
company has had an operating lending relationship may be less interested
in advancing further credit in the form of post commencement or exit
financing if it has no ongoing financial interest in the debtor. The
creditor may actually have over-coverage and thus a negative economic
interest, materially benefitting if the restructuring fails. Yet parties to the
restructuring currently have no information on the economic interest held
by those parties hedged through a credit derivative.
Accordingly, a debtor company may find the creditor that is hedged
under a CDS adamant in its refusal to agree to amendments to its credit
documentation (such as a payment change or deferral) and changes to
covenants that would otherwise trigger a default or obligation
acceleration. In addition, protection-buying creditors will be unlikely to
consent to the extension of the maturity date beyond the protection
period unless a credit event has already occurred or the extension itself
qualifies as a credit event. These motivations may complicate the efforts
of distressed companies to negotiate arrangements with their creditors at
the early stages of distress in an attempt to restructure outside of formal
insolvency proceedings. Moreover, a claims-trader creditor may be seen
as having a new, speculative and short-term interest in the debtor.
Having acquired its position when the debtor company is already in
financial difficulty, it is often hedging against the speculative outcome of
the restructuring process. Such a creditor, perhaps holding a deciding
vote, has little interest in the long-term viability of the company.
Moreover, the normative justification for carving out derivatives
from stays under restructuring proceedings is unclear, given the shift
from their risk-management function to speculative product. The failure
to stay derivatives claims creates a statutory preference for particular
creditors, over the claims of traditional secured creditors, employees,
trade suppliers, and tort claimants. Considering the general insolvency
81. Where there are cash settled credit default swaps, on occurrence of a credit
event, the CDS may be settled by determining the value of the underlying debt instrument
through an ISDA-run or similar auction, whereby the protection seller pays the protection
buyer for its estimated loss based on the value established in the auction or where a value
can be determined based on post-credit-event bids for the debt product.
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law goals of transparency, timeliness, and certainty, such exclusion must
be revisited. As the bailouts of 2008-2009 illustrated, there is a broader
public interest in how the global derivative market is to operate
effectively, and adjustments to the system must be made after publicpolicy discussion among stakeholders broader than industry participants.
Interests affected are beyond capital-markets participants, and regulation
is needed to ensure that there is transparency in the nature of economic
exposure and underlying risk. There should be a public-policy debate on
whether there is a need to design new principles to account for the
separation of economic and legal interest in the context of insolvency
proceedings.
These observations are not to suggest that the market has failed to
address some of its flaws itself. CDS protocols and index auctions have
helpfully assisted in facilitating cash settlements. The purpose of such
protocols is to offer market participants an efficient way to settle credit
derivative transactions referencing. The protocol mechanism facilitates
83
industry-wide net settlement of CDS referencing an insolvent entity.
While these innovations are important, they address only one aspect of
the settlement process. There continues to be a lack of transparency as to
who is bearing the ultimate costs of the deficiencies in value when all the
CDS settlements are completed. There are also significant issues in
respect of central counterparty clearing facilities and the need for
regulatory intervention that are beyond the scope of this discussion.
Some jurisdictions have statutorily created unsecured creditors'
committees, where representative creditors have a role in the negotiations
for an insolvency workout, paid out of the insolvency estate, and such
82. ISDA Protocols, supra note 3. For example, when Collins & Aikman filed for
bankruptcy in 2005, there were concerns that there were not enough deliverable bonds to
settle all the existing index-related contracts. To address this issue, the ISDA published
the first protocols to amend the existing contracts for index-related trades to cash
settlement from physical settlement on a multi-lateral basis, rather than through
counterparty-to-counterparty negotiations, and to participate in an auction to determine
the cash-settlement price of the defaulted bonds. With the CDS outstanding greater by
multiples than the volume of bonds issued, the bonds would have to be bought and sold
numerous times in the market to settle the CDS, which would have created pressure to
source bonds, raising the price of the bonds higher than the likely recovery value. Hence,
the market developed credit event auctions, first to facilitate cash settlement and more
recently, to allow for physical settlement on net open positions. Nomura, CDS Recovery
Basis, ISDA, 2006.
83. ISDA Auction Process, 2008, http://www.isda.org. The Lehman Brothers
Holdings' auction illustrated that the market can price the value of CDS and allow cash
settlement for counterparties to CDS trades. The auction set a price and resulted in
protection sellers paying ninety-one cents on the dollar to protection buyers. More than
350 organizations adhered to the 2008 Lehman CDS Protocol, which provided a
settlement procedure for approximately $6 billion of net CDS exposures; ISDA 2008
Lehman CDS Protocol, id.
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committees often have strong normative sway with the court. 84 In some
jurisdictions, courts recognize ad hoc committees of creditors for similar
purposes. In thinking about the disconnection between economic interest
and legal claim, it may be that the price for participation on such
committees should be that such creditors are required to disclose the
extent to which their economic risk has been hedged, with the court
given authority to refuse to let the creditor participate where there is little
or no economic interest.
Arguably, there should be mandatory disclosure during a
restructuring proceeding of the real economic risks at stake, including
disclosure of the amount of debt that has been hedged by creditors that
seek to exercise their voting or oversight rights in a restructuring
proceeding. Lack of transparency now means that the debtor company
and other creditors are not aware of who is bearing the real economic
risk of firm failure, inhibiting the potential for a viable business
restructuring plan. The court should be granted authority to determine
the scope and timing of disclosure, including making determinations in
respect of confidentiality, limiting access only to parties in the
proceeding, and determining any exceptions, such as for de minimus
holdings. The court's consideration of any restructuring plan should take
account of economic interests at stake. This weighing of interest could
be accomplished in two different ways: voting on a restructuring plan
could be premised on the real economic interests in the firm's
insolvency, or alternatively, legal voting rights could be unaffected, but
the court could be granted authority to weigh actual economic interests
when considering parties' positions and exercise of voting rights. It is
also helpful to consider amending insolvency-restructuring legislation to
include credit derivatives within the mandatory stay of proceedings,
except with leave of the court on the basis of unfair prejudice, the
standard currently used for other creditors to be exempted from the stay.
The court could then exercise oversight of the clearing process in a
measured way that assists with the risk-management aspects of the
Such an approach could
products and slows the speculative market.
ensure that derivatives continue to settle where they are not adversely
affecting the workout process, but could be stayed where the court was
persuaded that the stay would prevent inappropriate conduct or would
preserve going concern value pending negotiations for a restructuring
plan.

84.
85.

See, e.g., Rule 2019 of the US Bankruptcy Code.
Sarra,supra note 75, at 8.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Post-commencement and exit financing in insolvency proceedings
continue to pose significant challenges, both in respect of attracting such
financing and in considering how its availability and terms affect other
stakeholders and the overall integrity of the insolvency system. While
stalking horse proceedings, credit bids and other strategies to generate
higher value have been a helpful response to financing in a period of
global financial uncertainty and tightened credit conditions, they pose
new challenges for other aspects of the insolvency system, such as the
need for transparency and fairness; the need to consider multiple
stakeholder interests; and the public interest in encouraging viable
businesses with workable and fair business plans. The uncoupling of
interest that has accompanied credit derivatives and their influence in
insolvency proceedings has not yet garnered the attention of
governments to date in any meaningful way, and the current extensive
reforms proposed in the US and elsewhere have failed to address the
issues raised by these products within insolvency restructuring
proceedings. Post-commencement and exit financing are critically
important to the restructuring goals of insolvency legislation. The
challenges posed require considerably more attention over the next
period.

